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ABSTRACT 
The 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that “the 
United States must be prepared to respond to the use of WMD against our citizens, our 
military forces, and those of friends and allies.”  Scenario #1 of the 15 Department of 
Homeland Security national planning scenarios is an improvised nuclear detonation in the 
national capitol region. An effective response involves managing large-scale incident 
response, mass casualty, mass evacuation, and mass decontamination issues.  
Preparedness planning activities based on this scenario provided difficult challenges in 
time critical decision making and managing a large number of casualties within the 
hazard area.  Perhaps even more challenging is the need to coordinate a large scale 
response across multiple jurisdictions and effectively responding with limited 
infrastructure and resources. 
 
Federal response planning continues to make improvements in coordination and 
recommending protective actions, but much work remains.  The most critical life-saving 
activity depends on actions taken in the first few minutes and hours of an event.  The 
most effective way to reduce the enormous national and international social and 
economic disruptions from a domestic nuclear explosion is through planning and rapid 
action, from the individual to the federal response.  Anticipating response resources for 
survivors based on predicted types and distributions of injuries needs to be addressed. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War specter of strategic 
thermonuclear war and mutually assured 
destruction, with the possibility of 
hundreds of nuclear strikes on our major 
cities and the majority of the United 
State covered with lethal fallout is 
thankfully greatly diminished.  However 
the possibility of nuclear terrorism still 
exists through the use of a relatively 
crude, low yield nuclear device in a 
modern city.   The United States 
government has made impressive 
investments to prevent this through non-
proliferation activities overseas and by 
improving our ability to detect such a 
device as it moves across or within our 
borders.  Even so, as stated in the 2002 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction; the United States 
must be prepared to respond to the use 
of WMD against our citizens, our 
military forces, and those of friends and 
allies. We will develop and maintain the 
capability to reduce to the extent 
possible the potentially horrific 
consequences of WMD attacks at home 
and abroad.”   
 
If a nuclear detonation were to occur in a 
modern US city, the greatest reduction 
of casualties is achieved through actions 
taken by citizens themselves and their 
state and local officials.  The most 
critical decisions are those made in the 
first few minutes.  Unfortunately the 
“potentially horrific consequences” of a 
domestic nuclear explosion are exactly 
the reason that preparing for it seems 
impossible.  Many consider such an 
event to be so catastrophic that local 
response planning may be useless.  
There is a misguided impression that 
there would be no responders left after 
the detonation or that the initial response 
would be a federal government 
responsibility.  Without planning, this 
might be a self fulfilling prophecy with 
hundreds of thousands of additional 
potential casualties as a result.  By the 
nature of their work, response 
organizations are distributed throughout 
a community and the vast majority of the 
response base would survive.  However, 
without a basic level of large-scale 
emergency planning, these response 
organizations will not know how to 
apply their skills safely and effectively.   
Although considerable federal 
capabilities exist, it is unlikely that 
comprehensive assets would arrive in the 
first day and may be further delayed by 
national actions to prevent or mitigate 
further attacks.  
 
NUCLEAR DETONATION EFFECTS 
The basic anatomy of a nuclear 
explosion is well known and 
documented in literature such as 
Glasstone’s The Effects of Nuclear 
Weapons1 and NATO documents2.  
Mitigating the impact of a domestic 
nuclear explosion requires a basic 
understanding of key effects.  These 
effects can be broken into two main 
components: prompt and delayed. As an 
example, the effects identified below are 
approximate for a 10 kiloton (kt) nuclear 
explosion in a large city like 
Washington, DC.  This is consistent with 
the national planning scenario #1 and 
with early nuclear weapons such as those 
used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
 
Primary among prompt effects is blast. 
A 10kt explosion is equivalent to 5,000 
truck bombs like the one used to destroy 
the Murrah building in the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing3.  Blast will 
damage or destroy most buildings within 
½ mile of the detonation location and it 
is unlikely that the population in this 
area would survive.  From a ½ mile to 
about a mile out, survival will mostly 
likely depend on the type of structure a 
person was in when the blast occurred.  
Even at a mile, the blast wave will have 
enough energy to overturn some cars and 
severely damage some light structures. 
 
A mile from the detonation is also the 
approximate distance that a person 
outdoors could get a significant exposure 
of initial ionizing radiation.  The closer 
to the detonation point, the higher the 
exposure.  The same is also true for an 
outdoor individual’s exposure to the 
thermal pulse from the detonation, which 
may also cause burns to exposed skin 
out to this range and possibly further on 
a day with good visibility.  Both of these 
effects are reduced for people inside 
buildings. 
 
In addition to ionizing and thermal 
radiation, the detonation creates a 
brilliant flash of light that can cause 
temporary blindness to those outdoors 
over 5 miles away. This effect could go 
further if there is good visibility, clouds 
to reflect the light, or if the event occurs 
at night.  “Flash blindness” can even 
occur if the victim is not looking in the 
direction of the detonation. It can last 
several seconds to minutes.  Although 
this effect does not cause permanent 
damage, the sudden lost of vision to 
drivers and pilots could cause a large 
number of traffic casualties and make 
many roads impassable.  
 
Another, poorly understood, long range 
prompt effect is glass breakage.  Most of 
the injuries outside of the Murrah 
building in the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing were caused by this 
phenomenon4.  Extrapolating from more 
recent work on conventional explosives5, 
a 10kt explosion could break certain 
types of windows (e.g., large monolithic 
annealed) over 8 miles away.  Also 
noted in this same study was the 
tendency for glass to fail catastrophically 
even at extreme ranges, causing severe 
injury to those behind it.  NATO medical 
response planning documents2 for 
nuclear detonations state that “… missile 
injuries will predominate. About half of 
the patients seen will have wounds of 
their extremities. The thorax, abdomen, 
and head will be involved about 
equally.” A significant number of 
victims from Nagasaki arriving at field 
hospitals exhibited glass breakage 
injuries6. 
 
Other effects, such as the 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and fires, 
also need to be considered in response 
planning.  For a ground level detonation 
most EMP effects will be limited to 
within a mile, with a few, random, 
longer range disruptions occurring out to 
a few miles.  Although the possibility of 
a “firestorm” is unlikely given modern 
construction, there will be a large 
number of small, disparate fires started 
from thermal and blast effects (generally 
around the 1 mile perimeter) which 
could spread and coalesce if not 
mitigated. 
 
The primary delayed effect from a 
ground level nuclear detonation is from 
“fallout.” Fallout is generated when the 
dust and debris excavated by the 
explosion is combined with radioactive 
fission products and drawn upward by 
the heat of the event.  This cloud rapidly 
climbs through the atmosphere, up to 5 
miles high for a 10kt, and highly 
radioactive particles coalesce and drop 
back down to earth as it cools.  It is 
important to note that Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki did not have significant fallout 
because their detonations occurred at 
altitude.  
  
The hazard from fallout comes not from 
breathing the particles, but being 
exposed to the ionizing radiation they 
give off after they have settled on the 
ground and building roofs.  Radiation 
levels from these particles will drop off 
quickly, with most (55%) of the 
potential exposure occurs in the first 
hour and 80% occurs within the first 
day.  Although it is highly dependant on 
weather conditions, the most dangerous 
concentrations of fallout particles (i.e., 
potentially fatal to those outside) occur 
within 10 miles downwind of the event 
and are clearly visible as they fall, often 
the size of fine sand or table salt.7  
 
Unlike prompt effects which occur too 
rapidly to avoid, fallout health impacts 
can be mitigated by leaving the area 
before it arrives or by sheltering.  
Although some fraction of ionizing 
radiation can penetrate buildings, the 1) 
shielding offered by walls and 2) 
distance from outdoor fallout particles 
can easily reduce exposures by a factor 
of ten or more for urban buildings (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Transmission factors for various 
shelter locations1 
Shelter Location Transmission 
Factor 
3-feet Underground 0.0002 
Frame House 0.3-0.6 
Basement  0.05-0.1 
Vehicle 0.5-0.7 
Apartment (Upper stories) 0.01 
Apartment (Lower stories)  0.1 
Concrete Blockhouse   
9-inch walls 0.007-0.09 
12-inch walls  0.001-0.03 
 
The smaller the transmission factor, the 
lower the dose that a sheltered person 
would receive compared to an 
unsheltered person in the same area.  For 
example, a person in the lower stories of 
an apartment building would receive 
only 10% of the dose that someone 
outside would receive.  Someone on the 
upper floors would receive only 1% of 
the dose.  In fallout areas, this could 
determine whether someone lives or 
dies. 
 
LACK OF GUIDANCE 
Although it may be initially unsafe for 
responders to enter significant fallout 
areas, the majority of prompt effects 
survivors will not be in these 
contaminated areas.  Most response 
organizations lack fundamental 
awareness and planning to understand a 
nuclear event. Given a daytime 
population density of a city like 
Washington DC, initial casualties could 
easily be in the hundreds of thousands 
and timely medical intervention could 
greatly improve the prognosis of the 
injured2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16. 
 
Unfortunately response planners face a 
lack of federal guidance and scientific 
consensus on the correct actions to take.  
The 2006 Federal Register Notice 
published by the Department of 
Homeland Security17, which clarified 
how existing protective action guidance 
can be applied for radiological and 
nuclear terrorism, did not specifically 
address guidance for the acute effects of 
a domestic nuclear explosion18. 
 
The Cold War civil defense program can 
help with some insights and advice, but 
many of the paradigms no longer apply.  
For example, the concept of a fallout 
shelter worked well with a few minutes 
warning of incoming missiles but is far 
less effective for an attack with no 
notice.  There also appears to be a lack 
of scientific consensus on the 
appropriate actions to take after a 
nuclear detonation.  The 
recommendations of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Ready.gov, which 
are consistent with the recommendations 
of the National Academy of Sciences19, 
were recently criticized by the 
Federation of American Scientists20 
because of conflicting recommendations 
with a  RAND study21 22. 
 
Work needs to be done to update our 
Cold War guidance to address the 
asymmetric threat we now face.  Both 
our society and our cities have changed 
significantly over the last half century 
and new preparedness guidance is 
required. 
 
The issue is gaining attention in 
Washington, as stated in House Report 
110-10723; “The conferees are concerned 
that cities have little guidance available 
to them to better prepare their 
populations to react in the critical 
moments shortly after a nuclear event.”  
This report also provided direction to the 
Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Health and Human 
Services to improve preparedness 
programs for responding to a nuclear 
attack. 
 
UPDATING PREPAREDNESS 
The Department of Homeland Security 
has extensive preparedness activities, 
including preparedness grants to states 
and urban areas totaling billions of 
dollars.  The Department’s preparedness 
programs and strategies favor an “all 
hazards approach” that stresses 
mitigating the effects of a variety of 
events24.  In this regard, preparedness for 
the low yield nuclear detonation scenario 
will create important capabilities for a 
number of catastrophic events that 
require: 
• coordinated regional response, 
• time critical decision-making, 
• mass casualty response, 
• crisis communication, & 
• resource prioritization. 
 
The Department of Homeland Security’s 
National Preparedness Guidance24 states; 
“Because major events will undoubtedly 
have a regional impact, there is no 
greater necessity than to collaborate on a 
regional basis to leverage expertise, 
share specialized assets, enhance 
capacity, and interoperate cohesively 
and effectively.”  Planning for the 
regional response to a nuclear detonation 
can be just the type of preparedness tool 
that can bring communities together for 
a common goal. 
 
Since so many lives depend on actions 
taken by citizens and responders in the 
first few hours, the capability to make 
decisions and disseminate guidance 
quickly is essential for a large number of 
rapidly unfolding catastrophic events.  A 
process must be in place to avoid the 
paralysis that can occur in the initial 
phases of an event when action needs to 
be taken and uncertainty about the nature 
of the event is high. 
 
As noted above, the sheer number, type, 
and distribution of injuries around a 
detonation represents a significant 
challenge to public health and 
emergency medical response.  Technical 
issues and uncertainty regarding 
contamination also complicate the 
medical response.  In order to be 
effective, concepts such as field triage, 
reception centers, field hospitals, and 
resource prioritization need to be 
considered in advance.  With the large 
number of prompt injuries, methods to 
stabilize and identify viable patients will 
be essential.  There will be insufficient 
resources to treat everyone, and 
prioritization planning will be required 
to respond and help a community 
manage mass casualty events. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Preparing a response to national 
planning scenario #1 can help bring a 
region together to address a number of 
difficult issues.  The capabilities gained 
through this process can facilitate an 
effective response to a variety of natural 
and manmade catastrophic events 
involving large-scale incident response 
coordination, mass casualty, mass 
evacuation, and mass care. 
 
However, before preparedness activities 
like those identified by Congress23 can 
begin, scientific consensus and federal 
guidance must be developed to support 
preparedness planning strategies. 
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